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ABSTRACT 
This paper incorporates anticipated and unexpected shocks to bank capital into a DSGE model 
with a banking sector. We apply this model to study Basel III countercyclical capital 
requirements and their implications for banking stability and household welfare. We introduce 
three different countercyclical capital rules. The first countercyclical capital rule responds to 
credit to output ratio. The second countercyclical rule reacts to deviations of credit to its steady 
state, and the third rule reacts to credit growth. The second rule proves to be the most effective 
tool in dampening credit supply, housing demand, household debt and output fluctuations as well 
as in enhancing the banking stability by ensuring that banks have higher bank capital and capital 
to asset ratio. After conducting a welfare analysis we find that the second rule outranks the other 
ones followed by the first rule, the baseline and the third rule respectively in terms of welfare 
accumulation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the recent global financial crisis, the Basel II fixed capital requirement principles were not 
sufficient to maintain the banking stability as many banks had insufficient capital and low capital 
to asset ratio to withstand the financial crisis. Since the financial crisis, there has been great 
attention and discussion about reviewing and updating the Basel capital rule framework which 
aims at the enhancement of banking stability. The Basel III committee proposes a time-varying 
capital requirement or a countercyclical capital ratio requirement. The main idea of the latter is 
that the capital requirement increases during a boom phase and decreases during a bust phase. In 
this paper, we study different countercyclical capital rules in the event of anticipated and 
unanticipated shocks to bank capital and their implications for the banking stability and 
household welfare.  
We introduce three Basel III countercyclical capital rules; the first rule is a countercyclical 
capital requirement principle responding to credit to GDP ratio, which is primarily recommended 
by the Basel committee. The second rule is a countercyclical requirement reacting to credit vis-à-
vis its steady state ratio. The third one is a countercyclical capital requirement rule reacting to 
credit growth. The baseline rule is represented by the Basel II fixed capital ratio principle. The 
main purpose of this paper is to seek which of these three rules provides the best outcome in 
terms of banking stability and welfare. We use a DSGE model with a banking sector based on 
Gerali et al. (2010). We extend the model by incorporating countercyclical capital rules and news 
shocks and unanticipated shocks to bank capital.  
Firstly, we examine the effects of anticipated and unexpected shocks to bank capital on the 
banking stability under the Basel II fixed capital rule. In our work, we utilize the term instability 
of the banking sector when capital to asset ratio is below its steady state. The main finding that 
under the Basel II fixed capital rule, a positive news’ shock to bank capital induces banks to be 
less prudent hence they reduce the holding of capital to asset ratio. However, when the positive 
news about bank capital do not materialize, banks suddenly find themselves with a capital to asset 
ratio below its steady state, an effect that captures the instability of the banking sector.  
Secondly, we analyze the effects of bank capital shocks on banking stability under three Basel 
III countercyclical capital rules. The first and the second countercyclical rules contribute to the 
banking stability because they induce banks to hold more bank capital than the one by the Basel 
II principle. Under these countercyclical capital buffer rules, banks have capital to asset ratios 
above their steady state even though banks anticipate that there will be a positive shock to their 
capital. Furthermore, the first and the second capital rules are more effective in dampening credit 
booms, housing demand, household debt and output fluctuations compared to the fixed capital 
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rule. The third countercyclical rule does not contribute to the banking stability because it does not 
induce banks to hold more capital. As a result the bank capital to asset ratio is below its steady 
state, exactly as in the Basel II case. Furthermore, we find that the second countercyclical capital 
rule is the most effective tool to enhance banking stability. 
Thirdly, we study the implications of Basel III rules for household welfare. The 
implementation of the first and the second countercyclical capital rule improves household 
welfare relative to the fixed capital requirement. In particular, the second rule presents the highest 
household welfare. We find that the third rule is not welfare improving. We conduct a sensitivity 
analyses and the results indicate that the second countercyclical rule still provides the highest 
welfare compared to the other ones. 
This paper is related to mainly two areas of DSGE studies: the news’ shock literature and the 
literature on macroprudential policy. DSGE papers with news shocks such as by Beaudry and 
Portier (2004, 2006), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), Christiano et al. (2010) and Karnizova 
(2010) focus on technology news shocks while Lambertini et al. (2013) on multiple news shocks. 
However, those papers do not introduce news’ shocks that are originated within the banking 
sector while we attempt to explore this event. Next, studies on capital requirements and 
implications for macroeconomic dynamics in a DSGE framework are also explored; for example, 
in Christensen et al. (2011), Angeloni and Faia (2013), Angelini et al. (2014), Rubio and 
Carrasco-Gallego (2014 and 2015). Our study is more tangible to Angelini et al. (2014) and 
Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014 and 2015), nevertheless the main difference is two-fold: our 
paper has incorporated also anticipated shocks to bank capital, whilst we also study three 
countercyclical capital rules and their implications for banking stability and household welfare. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the DSGE model. Section 3 presents 
the stochastic processes of anticipated and unanticipated shocks. Section 4 presents benchmark 
calibration and model parameters. Section 5 introduces the three countercyclical capital rules, 
while section 6 shows impulse responses for the investigated economy. Section 7 presents an 
exhaustive welfare analysis under the benchmark calibration as well as under different horizons 
of news’ shocks, while it also investigates the welfare effect of financial distress under three 
countercyclical capital rules. Finally, section 8 concludes. 
 
2. MODEL 
2.1 Patient Household 
The objective function of a representative patient household is 
 ∑  	 
, + ω, − ,

     (1) 
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where the index   refers to a patient household,  is the discount factor, , is consumption, 
, denotes the holding of housing stock, !, labor hours, ω is a weight on housing and " is the 
Frisch labor supply elasticity. 
The patient household consumes and makes deposits #, at a bank. The nominal net deposit 
rate is denoted by $%, and & is inflation rate, so (1 + $%,)) &⁄  is the real gross interest rate on 
deposits. The household purchases houses and real house prices are denoted by ,. The patient 
household supplies labor hours for an entrepreneur and earns -,  ⁄ !,, where -, is the 
nominal wage and   is the price of consumption goods. It also receives a lump-sum transfer 
denoted by Π,, which includes dividends from a retail firm and a bank. Our particular 
household faces the following budget constraint 
, + #, + ,, − ,) = (01,2)3 #,) + 4, !, + Π,    (2) 
It chooses ,, #,, and , to maximize (1) subject to (2), and the first-order conditions are 
written as 

5, =  6 5, (01,)3 7       (3) 
8
5, = 9:, +  
 85,          (4) 
and 
4;,
5;, = !,          (5) 
The trade-off between current and future consumption taking account the real interest rate is 
shown by equation (3). The marginal cost and the marginal benefit of housing define the optimal 
demand for housing in equation (4). The patient household takes into account the current cost of 
an extra house, a direct utility gain from having a house and the expected resale of the house 
when purchasing a house. Finally, equation (5) is the optimal labor supply for the patient 
household. 
 
2.2 Impatient Household 
In this case, the objective function of the representative impatient household is 
 ∑  	 
<, + ω<, − =,

        (6) 
where the index > refers to the impatient household, < is the discount factor, <, is 
consumption, <, denotes the housing holding, !<, denotes labor hours, ω is a weight on 
housing and " is again the Frisch labor supply elasticity. The impatient household obtains loans 
?<, from a bank in order to buy houses. Moreover, the impatient household pays back the loans 
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to the bank 1 + $<,)?@,) &⁄ , where $<,) is the net nominal interest rate on household 
loans. The household works for an entrepreneur and receives labor income -<,  ⁄ !<,, where 
-<,  ⁄  is the real wage and the nominal wage -<,. Also it belongs to a labor union by paying a 
membership fee Π<,. The budget constraint in real terms is written as 
<, + ,<, − <,) + 0=,23 ?<,) = ?<, + 4=, !<, + Π<,     (7) 
The impatient household faces the following collateral constraint  
 A(0=,)3 B ?<, ≤ D<,<,    (8) 
Additionally, it can borrow up to a fraction D< of the expected value of house ,<,. The 
household maximizes the expected utility (6) subject to the budget constraint (7) and the 
collateral constraint (8) 

5=, = < 60=,5=,37 + E<, A0=,3 B     (9) 
8
5=, = F:=, + < 6 85=,7 + D<E<,G,H   (10) 
and 
4=,
5=, = !<,    (11) 
Equation (9) captures the optimal consumption for this impatient household. Aside from the real 
interest rate, the trade-off between current and future consumption is also affected by the housing 
collateral value. Equation (10) represents the optimal demand for housing. In our specific set-up 
the impatient household takes into account the current cost of an extra house, a direct utility gain 
from having a house, the expected resale value of house and the collateral value. Lastly, equation 
(11) is the optimal labor supply for our impatient household. 
 
2.3 Entrepreneur 
Next, the objective function for a representative entrepreneur is 
 ∑ I 	 I,   (12) 
where I is the entrepreneur’s discount factor and I, is the entrepreneur’s consumption. The 
entrepreneur produces intermediate goods JI, and sells the intermediate goods to retailers at a 
price  4. The markup of the final goods over the intermediate goods is defined as K =    4⁄ .4 
The entrepreneur faces the following production function 
JI, = (LM))N!()N)  (13) 
                                                 
4
 Section 2.5 provides more details on retailers. 
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where ! is aggregate labor, which comprises patient and impatient households’ labors ! =
!,O!<,)O, where P is the labor income share of a patient household. The capital share in 
the production function is denoted by Q. M is capital stock and L is the capacity utilization rate. 
The entrepreneur faces the following budget constraint 
I, + -,  !, +
-R,  !<, +
(1 + $I,))& ?I,) + ,S,M + T(L)M) =
JI,K + ?I, 
+,S,(1 − U)M)     (14) 
where ?I, represent new loans to the entrepreneur, $I, is the net nominal interest rate on loans 
to the entrepreneur, ,S, is the real capital price, and T(L) is the adjustment cost of capital 
utilization. The entrepreneur faces the following collateral constraint 
 A(0V,)3 B ?I, ≤ DI,S,(1 − U)M   (15) 
Furthermore, the entrepreneur can borrow up to a fraction DI  of the expected value of capital 
,S,(1 − U)M given the depreciation rate of capital. The entrepreneur maximizes (12) 
subject to (13), (14) and (15). 

5V, = I 6 0V,5V,37 + EI, A0V,3 B   (16) 
WS, = NX Y(LM))(N))(!)()N)Z      (17) 
WS, = [ + [\(L − 1)        (18) 
 
8],
5V, + I A[(L − 1) + ^_\ (L − 1)\B =
I 6`],5V,7 + I 68],
()a)
5V, 7 + EI,Y,S,(1 − U)Z   (19) 
 
P(1 − Q) bV,X = 4;, c !,   (20) 
and 
(1 − P)Q bV,X = 4d, c !R,      (21) 
Equation (16) captures the optimal consumption condition for the entrepreneur. It can be seen 
that this condition is quite similar to that applied for an impatient household. Equation (17) 
captures WS, as the return to capital and equation (18) represents the optimal level of capacity. 
The optimal demand for capital with collateral constraint is determined by equation (19). 
Equations (20) and (21) show the optimal demand for labor for the patient and impatient 
household respectively. 
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2.4 Capital Good Producer 
We start off with the objective function of the capital producer which is  
 ∑ I 	 ΛI,Y,S,(M − (1 − U)M)) − fZ  (22) 
where IΛI, is the entrepreneur’s stochastic discount factor, and f is investment goods. The 
capital producer chooses M and f to maximize (22) subject to the capital-accumulation equation 
M = (1 − U)M) + g1 − hi2 

ff) − 1
\k f 
The first order condition for capital is given as 
1 = ,S, 61 − lm\ n @@2 − 1o
\ − lm\ n @@2 − 1o @@27 + I 6ΛI,,S,hi n@@ − 1o n@@ o
\7   (23) 
Equation (23) determines the optimal capital supply. The optimal demand for capital is given by 
previous equation (19). 
 
2.5 Retailer 
The retail sector is the source of sticky prices. Retailers buy intermediate goods from 
entrepreneurs at a competitive price, and transform them into the final goods which are sold at the 
retail price  . The retailers operate under monopolistic competition and face a price adjustment 
cost. The Phillips curve shows the relationship between inflation and output which is expressed 
as 
1 − pq + rsX −
lt
\ n& − &)ut &uto & +  AΛ,hv n& − &ut&uto & bb B = 0  (24) 
where hv is a price adjustment cost, K =    4⁄  is the aggregate markup of the retail good 
prices over the intermediate good prices, and  & =    )⁄  is the inflation. 
 
2.6 Banking Sector 
Our specification for the banking sector is originating from the work of Gerali et al. (2010). In 
particular, the banking sector consists of a continuum of monopolistically competitive banks. 
Each bank x ∈ G0,1H has two retail units and a wholesale unit. The first retail unit of bank x offers 
slightly differentiated loan products to impatient households and entrepreneurs and the retailer 
sets the loan rates. The second retail unit collects deposits from patient households and sets the 
deposit rate. The wholesale unit provides wholesale loans - which is in fact another name for 
interbank loans to the retail loan unit. The wholesale unit collects deposits from the retail unit and 
uses the deposits and its own bank capital to finance its interbank lending. Moreover, the 
wholesale unit has to maintain its bank capital to asset ratio to meet a target capital requirement 
that is exogenously imposed by a macroprudential authority. 
8 
 
The next section presents the retail deposit unit and the retail loan unit. The retail deposit unit 
operates under monopolistic competition, thus it issues slightly differentiated deposit products 
#, to patient households. The retail deposit unit collects deposits from patient households and 
then sells them to the wholesale unit. The deposit unit faces adjustment costs when altering its 
deposit rate captured by a parameter h% as the degree of adjustment cost, which creates the lag 
effects of monetary policy on the deposit rate. The deposit rate setting condition is expressed as 
p% − 1 − p% 001, − h% 
 01,01,2 − 1 01,01,2  +  gΛ,h% 
01,01, − 1 
01,01, 
\ %
% k =0     (25) 
where p% < −1 is the elasticity of substitution of deposit. 
The deposit rate setting condition shows that the current deposit rate $%, depends on the 
expected deposit rate $%,, the last period deposit rate $%,) and the policy rate $. 
Furthermore, the current retail deposit rate adjusts slowly to changes in the policy rate because it 
is costly for the bank to adjust its deposit rate as h% > 0 that is why this represents sticky interest 
rates. 
The retail loan unit obtains wholesale loans from the wholesale unit. The retail unit can 
transform wholesale loans to slightly differentiated loan products because the retail operates 
under monopolistic competition. We assume that the retail loan unit faces adjustment costs under 
varying loan rates which is captured by the parameter h| > 0. The adjustment costs introduce 
sticky loan interest rates, so the current retail loan rate slowly reacts to changes in the policy rate 
1 − p| + p| 0},0~, − h| 
 0~,0~,2 − 1 0~,0~,2 +  gΛ, 
0~,0~, − 1 
0~,0~, 
\ ~,
~, k = 0     (26) 
where p| > 1 is the elasticity of substitution of loans. The loan rate setting condition shows that 
the current loan interest rate $|, (indexed by  =  , >) depends on the expected loan interest 
rate $|,, the previous period loan interest rate $|,) and the wholesale loan rate $, 
which is influenced by the policy rate. Hence, the current retail loan rate does not immediately 
react to variations in the policy rate. 
 
2.7 Wholesale Unit 
The wholesale unit provides wholesale loans (interbank loans)  to the retail loan unit with the 
net wholesale loan rate being $@,. The wholesale unit collects deposits # from the retail deposit 
unit on which the wholesale unit pays interest rate of $4, (the net wholesale deposit rate). The 
wholesale unit manages its capital M, which is accumulated out of reinvested profits and the it 
uses M, and # to finance interbank loans. The wholesale unit also has to meet a target capital to 
asset ratio level  which is imposed by a macroprudential authority. When the capital to asset 
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ratio M, ⁄  deviates from the target level, the bank incurs the following cost l}\ n}, −
o\ M,, where h > 0 measures the intensity of cost of deviating its capital ratio from the 
target capital ratio, namely the intensity of financial distress. A higher h means that financial 
markets become distressed, thus a small deviation of capital ratio from the target capital ratio 
makes it harder for banks to obtain funds form the interbank market. In section 9, we conduct a 
sensitivity analysis on the parameter h and its implication for countercyclical capital rules and 
welfare accumulation.  
The wholesale unit maximizes the following objective function  
 ∑ 	 Λ, 6$@, − $4,# − l}\ n}, − o
\ M,7  (27) 
subject to 
The balance sheet constraint is 
 = # + M,  (28) 
and the bank capital accumulation equation 
M, = (1 − U)M,) + Ω)    (29) 
where M, is the real bank capital, U measures resources used in managing bank capital and Ω 
is the bank real profit. We introduce anticipated and unexpected shocks to the bank capital in 
section 3. The optimal condition for credit supply is given as 
$@, = $4, − h n}, − o n}, o
\
 (30) 
We assume that each bank has access to unlimited finance from the central bank remunerated at 
the policy rate $, and through arbitrage the net wholesale deposit rate equals the policy rate that 
is $ = $4,. 
$@, = $ − h n}, − o n}, o
\
     (31) 
The left-hand side of equation (30) represents a loan supply.  When loans increase, the capital–
asset ratio falls below  and this induces the bank to raise the lending rate. The interbank loan 
spread is defined as the difference between the wholesale loan rate and the policy rate $@, − $. 
 
2.8 Central Bank 
We present a Taylor rule in which monetary policy responds to inflation and output growth 
(1 + $) = (1 + $))(1 + $)()) 
n33 o
 n bb2o
  ())  (32) 
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where $ is the policy rate at the steady state, 0 ≤  ≤ 1 measures interest-rate inertia, and 
3 ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0 capture the response of the policy rate to current inflation and output growth 
respectively. 
 
3. STOCHASTIC BANK CAPITAL SHOCKS 
This section introduces stochastic processes i.e., bank capital shocks which attempt to capture 
bank complacency before the U.S. financial crisis, hence their unpreparedness under the Basel II 
fixed capital requirement framework. The motivation for introducing bank capital shocks is the 
following: prior to the recent financial crisis banks were optimistic about the “health” and 
stability of the banking system. Banks anticipated a positive shock to their capital as they 
expected the banking system will continue to flourish, and this induced them to hold less current 
capital relative to assets. As a consequence, their assets rapidly grew more than the current 
capital, thus their current capital to asset ratio became very low. However, during the financial 
crisis, banking institutions suddenly found themselves unprepared for the crisis as they had low 
capital to asset ratios.  
We attempt to capture the above story by incorporating a shock to bank capital p. The bank 
capital evolves according to 
M, = (1 − U)M,)p + Ω)     (33) 
where M, is the real bank capital, U measures resources used in managing bank capital and Ω 
is the bank real profit. The exogenous shock to bank capital evolves as 
p = p) + , + [,)v    (34) 
where 0 <  < 1. The error terms consist of an unexpected shock , and an anticipated shock 
[,)v that is observed  quarters in advance. The unanticipated and anticipated shocks have a 
white noise property. For an illustrative purpose, we set  to be 8. In period 1, banks anticipate a 
positive shock to their capital which will occur in period 9. Thus, a positive anticipated shock 
induces banks to increase their credit supply while they reduce their capital, thus capital to asset 
ratio. However, in period 9 the positive shock to bank capital does not materialize, and this comes 
as a surprise to banks. Then banks realize that there is no a positive shock to their capital hence 
they find themselves to be inadequate to withstand the burden of such crisis because their capital 
to asset ratios are too low. Now the low capital to asset ratio threatens banking stability. These 
anticipated and unexpected shocks to bank capital aim to capture the complacency of banks 
before the financial crisis and their unpreparedness under Basel II fixed capital requirements. In 
section 5, we introduce three different countercyclical capital ratio rules and then we study their 
implications for banking stability and welfare. 
11 
 
4. PARAMETERIZATION AND CALIBRATION 
We thereafter present a benchmark calibration; model value parameters originate from the study 
of Gerali et al. (2010). We solve the model by log-linearizing the non-linear system around the 
unique steady state utilizing Bayesian techniques according to Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) 
and Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2004).  
Table 1 reports the benchmark calibration. In particular, the patient household’s discount factor 
 is set at 0.9443 to match the average monthly rate on M2 deposits. The impatient household 
and entrepreneur’s discount factors @ and I are 0.975, following Iacoviello (2005). We set the 
discount factor of the impatient household and entrepreneur to be smaller than that of the patient 
one because we want to ensure that the collateral constraints will be binding around the steady 
state (Iacoviello, 2005). The entrepreneur’s LTV ratio DI is set at 0.35, and the household’s LTV 
ratio DR is set at 0.7. For the banking parameters, the benchmark bank capital ratio  is set to 
0.9, which reflects the Basel II capital ratio requirements. The cost for deviating from the bank 
capital requirement h is estimated to be 11.07, albeit for which we will conduct a sensitivity 
analysis on this parameter at a later stage. 
The steady-state spread between the interest rate on household loans and the wholesale loan 
rate is about 2.16 percentage points in annual terms. Therefore, the markup over the wholesale 
loan rate rdrd) is 1.56, so we set the elasticity of substitution of household loans pR to 2.79. The 
steady-state spread between the interest rate on business loans and the wholesale loan rate is 
approximately 1.82 percentage points in annual terms. Thus, this spread implies that the markup 
over the wholesale loan rate rVrV) is 1.47, and the elasticity of substitution of loans to 
entrepreneurs pI is 3.12. The steady-state spread between the policy rate and the deposit rate is 
approximately 1.57 percentage points in annual terms, so we set the elasticity of substitution of 
deposits p% to -1.46, which implies that the markdown over the policy rate r1r1) is 0.60. The 
persistence of the bank capital shock is set at 0.810, and the standard deviation of anticipated and 
unanticipated shocks is set at 0.031. 
 
5. RULES FOR COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL RATIO REQUIREMENTS 
We propose three different types of Basel III countercyclical capital ratio rules. The first 
countercyclical rule employs a macroprudential authority in adjusting the capital to asset ratio 
requirement in response to movements in credit to output ratio, as suggested by the Basel III 
framework. A higher credit to output ratio leads to a higher capital requirement. The first 
countercyclical capital ratio rule is specified as 
12 
 
, =  nb o

  (35) 
where , is the time varying capital to asset ratio requirement,  is the steady state of the 
capital to asset ratio,  is the total loan or total credit in the economy and  is the degree of the 
countercyclical capital requirement. An increase in  will make the capital to asset ratio 
requirement reacts more strongly to changes in credit to output ratio. 
The second countercyclical capital ratio rule concerns the case whereby the capital to asset 
ratio requirement reacts to a deviation of credit from its steady state as 
, =  n o

  (36) 
where  is the steady state of credit supply. 
The third countercyclical capital ratio rule is applied when the capital to asset ratio 
requirement reacts to credit growth 
, =  n 2o

  (37) 
The baseline rule is captured by the Basel II fixed capital requirements; it employs the steady-
state of the capital to asset ratio requirement, i.e., , = . 
 
6. MODEL SIMULATIONS 
To recall we have introduced three Basel III countercyclical capital ratio rules. The first one 
responds to credit vs. output ratio, the second rule reacts to a deviation of credit from its steady 
state and the third rule is implemented when capital requirement ratio reacts to credit growth. The 
baseline is represented by the Basel II fixed capital requirements. The purpose of this section is to 
analyze the effects of bank capital shocks upon banking stability and macro-dynamics. We define 
instability of the banking sector the case when capital to asset ratio is below its steady state. 
Figure 1A to 1G show the impulse responses for anticipated and unanticipated shocks to bank 
capital for the various capital requirement cases. For an illustrative purpose, under the first, 
second and third countercyclical capital rules, we assign the coefficient  to be greater than zero, 
namely at 1. The black line with crosses represents the first rule (credit to output ratio), the thick 
black line displays the impact of the second rule (credit to its steady state), the black dashed line 
illustrates the third rule (credit growth) and the baseline rule is represented by the green line. 
Under the baseline rule (Basel II), a positive news’ shock about future bank capital induces banks 
to be less prudent and reduces the current bank capital, increasing their lending. The positive 
news shock captures the concept of banking institutions being complacent over a potential 
financial crisis also to an unexpected negative shock to the system. Specifically, as credit supply 
increases, the capital to asset ratio declines. Banks increase the amount of credit available to 
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impatient households and this effect encourages the households to borrow more and take on more 
debt. Low capital to asset ratio and high household debt make the banking sector become 
vulnerable to a sudden shock i.e., an unexpected negative shock to bank capital.  
During this credit boom, inflation rate tends to be low.5 The central bank responds to low 
inflation by cutting the policy rate to raise the inflation rate. However, a more expansionary 
monetary policy amplifies an expansion of mortgage credit and reduces the cost of deviating the 
capital to asset ratio from the capital target requirement. Hence, these impacts make banking 
sector even more vulnerable to a financial crisis. 
In the long-run period 9, the positive news shock about future bank capital does not 
materialize as a consequence of the fact that the banks find themselves their capital and capital to 
asset ratios having reached a level below the steady state. The economy is now facing imminent 
banking instability, which employs capital to asset ratios below their steady state, thus making the 
banking sector extremely vulnerable to a financial crisis. The banks respond to this unfulfilled 
news by abruptly increasing the holding of capital and capital to asset ratio and cutting the credit 
supply, which in turns has a negative impact on the real economy. After an economic expansion, 
output suddenly drops and then it declines toward its steady state. 
We conduct model simulations for the three different Basel III countercyclical capital rules. 
We see that under the first and second rule - following a positive news shock to bank capital - 
banks are required to hold more capital and capital to asset ratio compared to the third rule and 
the Basel II fixed capital requirement benchmark. Under the first or the second rule, a higher 
capital requirement forces banks to hold capital that is slightly below its steady state; as a result 
the capital to asset ratio stays above the steady state whereas the capital to asset ratio under the 
Basel II is below its steady state and the bank capital is considerably below its steady state. 
Moreover, in case of the first and second rules, the wholesale loan rate and the interest rate 
spreads are higher than that of Basel II and of the third Basel III rule. Hence, by introducing the 
first or the second capital buffer regulation, it contributes to banking stability as capital turns 
slightly below its steady state and the capital to asset ratio is above its steady state. The third 
capital rule yields very similar results to those of the Basel II fixed one. 
Interestingly, in period 9 the positive shock to bank capital does not materialize and this 
comes as a surprise to banks; however, under the first and second Basel III regulation banks are 
more prepared against “surprise” as they have been building up their capital before the news 
shocks to bank capital are realized. As a result, the capital to asset ratio is higher under the first 
                                                 
5
 A possible reason is that an increase in credit supply eases entrepreneurs’ collateral constraints. As a result, the entrepreneurs 
employ more capital and the marginal product of labor rises while the marginal cost decreases. This effect creates downward 
pressure on inflation. 
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and the second rule. Consequently, the banking stability under the first or the second rule is 
stronger than of the third and the Basel II fixed capital rule. The first or second countercyclical 
capital rule induces banks to be caution about external shocks to the banking sector, and this 
contributes significantly toward banking stability. 
Under the second countercyclical capital requirement regime, banks hold even more capital 
than under the first countercyclical capital requirement, so the level of capital to asset ratio under 
the second rule is higher than under the first rule. Moreover, the second rule is more effective in 
stabilizing housing demand, household debt and output than the first rule. Possible reasons 
include the following; changes in credit and changes in output tend to co-move thus variations in 
credit to output ratio tends be smaller than movements in credit relative to its steady state. As a 
result, the second rule tends to be more responsive than the first one.  
We conclude that the second rule is the most effective one for maintaining banking stability, 
as banks are more equipped to withstand potential shocks to the system hence they are more 
resilient to an imminent or underlying financial crisis. 
 
7. WELFARE ANALYSIS 
7.1 Patient and impatient households 
In this section, we compute welfare for both types of households under the three different Basel 
III countercyclical capital ratio rules. We follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and solve the 
model by using a second-order approximation to the structural equations for given 
countercyclical capital rules and then we evaluate the welfare. Patient and impatient household 
welfare are defined as follows 
-, ≡  ∑  	 
, + , − ,

         (38) 
and    
-<, ≡  ∑ < 	 
@, + <, − =,

        (39) 
Total household welfare is expressed as a weighted sum of the individual welfare as in Rubio and 
Carrasco‐Gallego (2014, 2015) and Nilavongse (2016): 
-:, = (1 − )-, + (1 − R)-<,       (40) 
where (1 − ) and (1 − <) are the weights on patient and impatient households respectively. 
We simulate the model for 50000 periods by feeding multiple anticipated and unanticipated 
bank capital shocks into the system of equations, and then we can calculate the mean of welfare. 
We define III as a Basel III countercyclical capital rule and II as the fixed capital requirement, 
which represents the Basel II regime. We follow Rubio and Carrasco‐Gallego (2014 and 2015) 
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and present welfare results in terms of consumption equivalent units (CE). The definition of CE is 
the fraction of consumption that households should give away to obtain the benefits of the 
implementation of a Basel III countercyclical capital rule. In particular: 
The CE for the patient household welfare is written as 
 = Y(1 − )(-,@@@ − -,@@ )Z − 1     (41)  
The CE for the impatient household welfare is written as 
< = Y(1 − @)(-<,@@@ − -<,@@ )Z − 1.   (42)  
The total CE can be written as 
: = Y(1 − R)(-:,@@@ − -:,@@ )Z − 1    (43)  
Next, we present the household welfare for the three countercyclical capital rules relative to the 
Basel II benchmark. Figures 2 and 3 show that the welfare of the patient and impatient household 
respectively. The results reveal that the implementation of the first or the second rule is welfare-
improving for both types of households, whereas the third rule is welfare-deteriorating for both 
types of households. Moreover, Figure 4 shows that the introduction of the first or the second rule 
increases the total household welfare, while the application of the third rule has a negative effect 
on total welfare. This aftereffect could be of the following cause: the first and second 
countercyclical capital buffer regulation makes banks cautious hence this induces them to hold 
capital to asset ratios above steady state, which in turn dampens credit supply, household debt 
and assists both types of households towards smoothing their consumption and demand for 
housing. The third rule makes banks less cautious thus they hold a capital to asset ratio below its 
steady state. As a result this reaction amplifies the response of supply of loans and household 
debt and amplifies the response of household consumption and housing demand. 
The second rule increases both types of household welfare and the total welfare more than the 
first one. A possible reason might be that the second rule dampens the supply of loans, household 
debt more than the first rule, as the second rule requires banks to be more cautious thereby hold 
more capital than under the second rule. The second regulation leads households to smoothing 
their consumption and demand for housing more effectively than the first one. The welfare under 
the second capital rule is higher than under the first ratio rule. The conclusion is that the second 
countercyclical capital rule is superior to and outranks the first, the third and the baseline rule in 
terms of welfare. 
 
7.2 Welfare Analysis and horizon of News’ Shocks 
We now set anticipated shocks to be observed 4 quarters ahead, whereas in the previous section 
the anticipated shocks to bank capital were observed 8 quarters ahead. Firstly, we compare the 
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welfare effect of the anticipated changes 4 quarters to anticipated 8 quarters in advance, as in 
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) and Lambertini et al. (2013). Secondly, we examine whether the 
welfare ranking of capital rules is still preserved when anticipated shocks are observed at a 
different period. In additional to anticipated shocks, the economic system is also affected by 
unanticipated shocks to bank capital as in the previous section.  
Figures 5, 6 and 7 show that by allowing anticipated shocks to be observed 4 quarters ahead, 
this amplifies the welfare under different capital countercyclical rules. As we can see, when the 
anticipated shocks are observed 4 quarters ahead, the welfare gains from following the first and 
second Basel III capital rules are higher relative to the anticipated shocks observed 8 quarters 
ahead, whereas households become worse off under the third Basel III capital rule. Figure 8 
indicates that the second countercyclical capital ratio rule still yields the highest welfare even 
though the anticipated shocks are observed 4 quarters in advance. The efficiency rank ordering in 
terms of welfare comprises the second rule, the first, the baseline and the third rule sequentially. 
 
7.3 Financial Distress and Welfare  
This section investigates financial distress and implications for welfare. Specifically, we conduct 
a sensitivity analysis directly on the parameter h which captures the intensity of financial 
distress (please see wholesale unit, under section 2.6). We compare the total welfare under the 
benchmark calibration distress case against the welfare under a significantly higher financial 
distress case. Under the benchmark calibration, the intensity of financial distress is set to 8.49 
whereas a high financial distress calibration rises to 18.  
Firstly, we compare the effect of an increase in financial distress on welfare given our 
different capital countercyclical rules and next we examine whether the welfare ranking of capital 
rules is still preserved as financial distress intensifies. Figures 9, 10 and 11 show the effect of a 
rise in financial distress on welfare under the various rules relative to the baseline. It appears that 
as financial distress intensifies, the welfare gains from following the first and second Basel III 
capital rules are higher, whilst households become worse off under the third Basel III rule. 
Particularly, Figure 12 indicates that the second countercyclical buffer rule yields the highest 
welfare even though the degree of financial distress keeps increasing.  
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
A countercyclical capital ratio requirement is designed to counteract financial imbalances and 
bolster banks’ resilience against external shocks, thus strengthening banking stability. In this 
paper, we introduce three Basel III countercyclical capital ratio rules. The first countercyclical 
capital rule refers to the case whereby capital ratio requirements respond to the credit to output 
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ratio as recommended by the Basel committee. The second rule incorporates the scenario of the 
capital ratio requirement reacting to credit to its steady rate ratio, while the third rule is 
encountered when the capital ratio requirement respond to credit growth. The baseline rule is the 
Basel II fixed capital ratio requirement.  
The results from model simulations show that under the Basel II regime, a positive news’ 
shock about future capital induces banks to reduce holdings of bank capital, capital to asset ratios 
and expand their credit supply, which in turn cause their capital to asset ratios drop below their 
steady state and lead to a rise in household debt. When the positive shock to bank capital is not 
realized, this creates banking instability as banks have been complacent about building up their 
capital, and consequently the bank capital ratio is below the steady state level under the Basel II 
regime. 
When the first or the second countercyclical capital rule is imposed, banks are required to 
hold more capital than under the Basel II and the third countercyclical rule even though banks 
anticipate a positive shock to their bank capital to occur. The first or the second rule induces 
banks to be more prudent hence these rules enhance banking stability as well as damp business 
cycle fluctuations. We also find that the third rule does not contribute toward banking stability 
whatsoever. 
Lastly, we conduct a welfare analysis for these three capital ratio rules, while keeping the 
Basel II rule as the baseline. We find that the first or the second rule leads to welfare improving 
relative to the baseline rule, while the introduction of the third rule worsens household welfare 
relative to the baseline. The efficiency rank ordering in terms of welfare comprises the second 
rule, the first, the baseline and the third rule respectively. Furthermore, after conducting 
sensitivity analyses the rank ordering in term of welfare is still preserved as such. We conclude 
that a countercyclical capital rule that reacts to deviations of credit to its steady state, will 
promote further banking stability and improve significantly household welfare. 
We contribute to the relevant literature in various ways. Specifically, Angelini et al. (2014) 
find that a time-varying capital ratio requirement can reduce macroeconomic volatility, regardless 
whether there is coordination between monetary and capital requirement policy or not. Rubio and 
Carrasco-Gallego (2014) find that a countercyclical capital requirement that reacts to credit 
growth, house prices and output, yields higher welfare than a fixed capital requirement. They also 
show that a capital requirement rule that reacts to deviations of credit from its steady state leads 
to a welfare improvement. The differences between our work and those studies are distinct; 
Angelini et al. (2014) and Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014, 2015) do not consider different 
types of capital ratio rules, whereas in our paper we compare different countercyclical capital 
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rules. Moreover, Carrasco-Gallego (2014, 2015) do not incorporate shocks to the banking sector 
nor news’ shocks either. Angelini et al. (2014) may show an unanticipated shock, however we 
consider both anticipated and unanticipated shocks to bank capital. Finally, they do not present an 
extensive welfare analysis as we pursued in our work. 
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TABLE 1. BENCHMARK CALIBRATION 
 
Parameter Description Value 
   
@ Impatient household’s discount factor 0.975 
   
 Patient household’s discount factor 0.9943 
   
I Entrepreneur’s discount factor 0.975 
   
DR Impatient household’s LTV 0.75 
   
DI Entrepreneur’s LTV 0.35 
   
 Weight of housing in household’s utility function 0.2 
 
 Capital to loans ratio requirement 0.09 
   
h Bank Leverage deviation cost 8.49 
   
U Cost for managing the bank’s capital position 0.1049 
 
h% 
 
Deposit rate adjustment cost 3.63 
   
hR Household rate adjustment cost 10.22 
   
hI Firm rate adjustment cost 9.51 
   
p% r1r1) is the markdown on deposit rate -1.46 
   
pR rdrd) is the markdown on household loans 2.79 
   
pI rVrV) is the markdown on business loans 3.12 
   
Q Capital share in the production function 0.25 
   
U Depreciation rate of capital 0.025 
   
P Share of patient household’s labor income 0.8 
   
" Inverse of the Frisch elasticity 1 
   
v Price indexation 0.17 
   
[ 
 
Parameter of adjustment cost for capital utilization 0.0478 
[\ Parameter of adjustment cost for capital utilization 0.00478 
   
pq rsrs) is the markup in the good market 6 
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   hv Parameter of adjustment cost for prices 30.57 
   
hi Parameter of adjustment cost for investment 10.26 
   
3 Taylor coefficient on inflation 0.35 
   
b Taylor coefficient on output growth 2.01 
   
 Taylor coefficient on interest rate inertia 0.77 
   
 Standard deviation of bank capital shock 0.031 
   
 Persistence of bank capital shock 0.810 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
FIGURE 1: IRFS FOR ANTICIPATED & UNANTICIPATED SHOCKS TO BANK CAPITAL FOR 
DIFFERENT CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS  
 
FIGURE 1A 
 
Notes: The black line with crosses represents the first rule (credit to output ratio), the thick black line represents the 
second rule (credit to its steady state), the black dashed line represents the third rule (credit growth) and the baseline 
rule is represented by the green line. 
 
FIGURE 1B  
 
Notes: The black line with crosses represents the first rule (credit to output ratio), the thick black line represents the 
second rule (credit to its steady state), the black dashed line represents the third rule (credit growth) and the base rule 
is represented by the green line. 
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FIGURE 1C  
 
Notes: The black line with crosses represents the first rule (credit to output ratio), the thick black line represents the 
second rule (credit to its steady state), the black dashed line represents the third rule (credit growth) and the base rule 
is represented by the green line. IM stands for impatient household. 
 
FIGURE 1D 
 
Notes: The black line with crosses represents the first rule (credit to output ratio), the thick black line represents the 
second rule (credit to its steady state), the black dashed line represents the third rule (credit growth) and the base rule 
is represented by the green line. 
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FIGURE 1E 
 
Notes: The black line with crosses represents the first rule (credit to output ratio), the thick black line represents the 
second rule (credit to its steady state), the black dashed line represents the third rule (credit growth) and the base rule 
is represented by the green line. 
 
FIGURE 1F 
 
Notes: The black line with crosses represents the first rule (credit to output ratio), the thick black line represents the 
second rule (credit to its steady state), the black dashed line represents the third rule (credit growth) and the base rule 
is represented by the green line. PH stands for patient household. 
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FIGURE 1G 
 
Notes: The black line with crosses represents the first rule (credit to output ratio), the thick black line represents the 
second rule (credit to its steady state), the black dashed line represents the third rule (credit growth) and the base rule 
is represented by the green line. 
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FIGURE 2: WELFARE OF PATIENT HOUSEHOLD 
 
 
Notes: The black line represents the first rule (credit to output ratio), the blue line represents the second rule (credit 
to its steady state) and the red line represents the third rule (credit growth). 
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FIGURE 3: WELFARE OF IMPATIENT HOUSEHOLD 
 
 
Notes: The black line represents the first rule (credit to output ratio), the blue line represents the second rule (credit 
to its steady state) and the red line represents the third rule (credit growth). 
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FIGURE 4: TOTAL HOUSEHOLD WELFARE 
 
 
Notes: The black line represents the first rule (credit to output ratio), the blue line represents the second rule (credit 
to its steady state) and the red line represents the third rule (credit growth). 
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FIGURE 5: TOTAL HOUSEHOLD WELFARE AT DIFFERENT NEWS HORIZONS (1ST RULE) 
 
 
Notes: We show total household welfare under the first rule at different news horizons. The thick black line 
represents welfare under anticipated shocks observed 8 periods in advance (as in the previous section) and the dashed 
black line represents the welfare under anticipated shocks observed 4 periods in advance. 
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FIGURE 6: TOTAL HOUSEHOLD WELFARE AT DIFFERENT NEWS HORIZONS (2ND RULE) 
 
 
Notes: We show total household welfare under the second rule at different news horizons. The thick black line 
represents welfare under anticipated shocks observed 8 periods in advance (as in the previous section) and the dashed 
black line represents the welfare under anticipated shocks observed 4 periods in advance. 
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FIGURE 7: TOTAL HOUSEHOLD WELFARE AT DIFFERENT NEWS HORIZONS (3RD RULE) 
 
 
Notes: We show total household welfare under the third rule at different news horizons. The thick black line 
represents welfare under anticipated shocks observed 8 periods in advance (as in the previous section) and the dashed 
black line represents the welfare under anticipated shocks observed 4 periods in advance. 
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FIGURE 8: TOTAL HOUSEHOLD WELFARE UNDER ALTERNATIVE NEWS SHOCK HORIZONS 
 
 
Notes: We show total household welfare under an alternative news shock horizon. The black line represents the first 
rule (credit to output ratio), the blue line represents the second rule (credit to its steady state) and the red line 
represents the third rule (credit growth). 
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FIGURE 9: TOTAL HOUSEHOLD WELFARE UNDER THE FIRST RULE 
 
 
Notes: We show total household welfare under the first rule. The thick black line represents welfare under a 
benchmark calibration financial distress case and the dashed black line represents the welfare under a higher 
financial distress case. 
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FIGURE 10: TOTAL HOUSEHOLD WELFARE UNDER THE SECOND RULE 
 
 
Notes: We show total household welfare under the second rule. The thick black line represents welfare under a 
benchmark calibration financial distress case and the dashed black line represents the welfare under a higher 
financial distress case. 
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FIGURE 11: TOTAL HOUSEHOLD WELFARE UNDER THE THIRD RULE 
 
 
Notes: We show total household welfare under the third rule. The thick black line represents welfare under a 
benchmark calibration financial distress case and the dashed black line represents the welfare under a higher 
financial distress case. 
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FIGURE 12: FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND TOTAL HOUSEHOLD WELFARE  
 
 
Notes: We show total household welfare under financial distress. The black line represents the first rule (credit to 
output ratio), the blue line represents the second rule (credit to its steady state) and the red line represents the third 
rule (credit growth). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Degree of Countercyclical Capital Requirement
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
W
e
lf
a
re
 G
a
in
 (
C
E
)
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
W
e
lf
a
re
 G
a
in
 (
C
E
)
10
-4
Total Household Welfare and Financial Distress
